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I construct an economy with heterogeneous agents that mimics the time-series behavior of
the earnings distribution in the United States from 1963 to 2003. Agents face aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks and accumulate real and ￿nancial assets. I estimate the shocks that drive the
model using data on income inequality, aggregate income, and measures of ￿nancial liberalization.
I show how the model economy can replicate two empirical facts: the trend and cyclical behavior of
household debt, and the diverging patterns in consumption and wealth inequality over time. While
business cycle ￿ uctuations can account for the short-run changes in household debt, its prolonged
rise of the 1980s and the 1990s can be quantitatively explained only by the concurrent increase in
income inequality.
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USA.This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents to study the
trend and the cyclical properties of household debt in a uni￿ed framework.1 The approach is
motivated by two empirical facts about the behavior of household debt, both illustrated in Figure
1. At long-run frequencies (top panel), the behavior of household debt closely mirrors earnings
inequality: the cross-sectional standard deviation of log earnings was roughly constant between
1963 and 1980 and increased sharply in the period between 1981 and 2003. At the same time,
gross household debt was relatively stable throughout the 1960s and the 1970s and since the 1980s
has jumped out of proportion with real activity, rising between 1981 and 2003 from 66 percent
to 113 percent of disposable personal income.2 At cyclical frequencies (bottom panel), household
debt moves together with economic activity. For instance, the correlation between annual growth
in disposable personal income and annual growth in household debt3 equals 0.49.
On the basis of this evidence, this paper asks the following question: can one construct a
quantitative dynamic model that explains the trend and the cycle in household debt? The answer
is yes. Two ingredients are crucial for this result. On the one hand, binding collateral constraints
for a fraction of the population explain the cyclicality of household debt. On the other, time-varying
cross-sectional dispersion in earnings goes a long way in explaining, qualitatively and quantitatively,
the trend. According to the model, the cyclicality of debt primarily re￿ ects the behavior of credit
constrained agents, whose credit constraints get relaxed in good times, thus allowing them to borrow
more. The trend rise in debt since the 1980s, instead, re￿ ects the increased access of households to
the credit market in order to smooth consumption in the face of more volatile incomes.
Explanations for the rise in household debt have referred to a combination of factors, including
smaller business cycle ￿ uctuations, the reduced costs of ￿nancial leveraging, changes in the regu-
latory environment for lenders and new technologies to control credit risk. To date, however, no
study has tried to connect systematically micro and macro volatility with the behavior of household
1In this paper household debt refers to the gross outstanding debt of households. In the Flow of Funds accounts,
household debt is constructed in a similar way, partly using microeconomic data, partly as a residual given data on
￿nancial assets owned by other sectors. In the model, I assume that all savings are frictionlessly intermediated by
a perfectly competitive banking sector, so that debt is the sum of all households￿￿nancial liabilities. I consider a
closed economy (so that net debt is zero) and do not allow for business or public or external debt.
2The increase in earnings inequality has been apparent in any data dimension (pre- and post-tax, between and
within groups, along the permanent and transitory components). The earnings inequality series I use is constructed
from Eckstein and NagypÆl (2004) using data drawn from the March Current Population Survey and refers to the
standard deviation of pre-tax log wages of full-time, full-year male workers. Measures of inequality constructed by
other authors and based on di⁄erent data sets or samples show the same pattern.
3Both series have been de￿ ated using the implicit price de￿ ator for personal consumption expenditures.
2debt. There are several reasons, however, to believe that both aggregate and idiosyncratic events
a⁄ect the need of households to access the credit market. This is the perspective adopted here.
At the aggregate level, macroeconomic developments should a⁄ect both the trend and the cyclical
behavior of debt: over long horizons, as countries become richer, their ￿nancial systems better
allocate the resources between those who have funds and those who need them. In addition, over
the cycle, borrowers￿balance sheets are strongly procyclical, thus causing credit to move in tandem
with economic activity.
At the cross-sectional level, the arguments are di⁄erent. Suppose that permanent income does
not change, but the individual income patterns become more erratic over time, thus raising earnings
dispersion at each point in time. Agents will try to close the gap between actual income (which
determines current period resources) and permanent income (which a⁄ects consumption) by trading
a larger amount of ￿nancial assets. When one aggregates these assets across the population, market
clearing implies that they sum to zero, but their dispersion increases. As a consequence, aggregate
debt - the sum of all the negative ￿nancial positions - rises when income dispersion is greater.
The stories above lead to the main question of the paper: how do the shocks to aggregate income
and to its distribution a⁄ect the behavior of credit ￿ ows? I address this issue by constructing a
model of the interaction between income volatility, household-sector ￿nancial balances, and the
distribution of expenditure and wealth. Households receive an exogenous income, consume durable
and non-durable goods, and trade a riskless asset in order to smooth utility. An exogenous fraction
of households is assumed to have unrestricted access to the credit market, which they use in order
to smooth expenditure in the face of a time-varying income pro￿le. The remaining households are
assumed to be impatient and credit constrained, in that they can only borrow up to a fraction
of their collateral holdings. At each point in time, the economy features variables that move in
line with macroeconomic aggregates. At the same time, time-varying volatility in the idiosyncratic
income shocks alters the distribution of income, and therefore of consumption, wealth, and ￿nancial
assets. Because my main goal is to understand the behavior of household debt, I use the model to
conduct the following experiment: I use data on income inequality to back out stochastic processes
for the idiosyncratic income shocks that allow replicating income inequality over time. I use data on
loan-to-value ratios and aggregate income to estimate processes for ￿￿nancial￿shocks and aggregate
income shocks. I then consider the role of each of these factors in explaining the patterns in the
data, in particular, the trend and the cyclical behavior of household debt and the distribution of
consumption and wealth across the population. The key ￿nding of the paper lies in the model￿ s
ability to explain three salient features of the data:
31. The model explains the timing and the magnitude of the rise in household debt over income
and attributes its increase to the concurrent rise in income inequality.
2. The model can reconcile the sharp increase in income inequality over the period 1981￿2003
with a smaller rise in consumption inequality, and a larger increase in wealth inequality.
3. The model captures well the cyclical behavior of household debt.
Because my main goal is to study the dynamics of the economy between 1963 and 2003, I assume
that, in 1963, the economy is in a steady state that exactly matches household debt and other key
macroeconomic variables. I then solve the model by linearizing around such a steady state the
equations describing the equilibrium and feed the model with shocks estimated from the actual
data. From the computational point of view, this technique has the advantage that, even when
dealing with a large number of agents, the equilibrium decision rules keep track of all the moments
of the wealth distribution. In addition, one does not need to restrict the stochastic components
of the model to a low dimensional discrete state process, and one can describe very accurately the
evolution of the variables over time. The linearization, of course, neglects the e⁄ects of risk on
optimal decisions and ignores constraints on the asset position that are occasionally binding: risk
considerations would call for higher order pertubation methods; occasionally binding constraints
and large shocks, however, would rule out perturbation methods in favor of global approximation
schemes. To address these issues, in the concluding part of the paper I study the transitional
dynamics of a bare-bones version of the model that can be conveniently solved using value (and
policy) function iteration and guessing a ￿nite time path for prices during the transition.4 I then
show that the results from the linear and the non-linear method are very close. The intuition is
simple, given the nature of the problem that the agents in the model face: the policy functions
of non-linear model are essentially linear in the region of state space where patient and impatient
agents spend their time; borrowing of the unconstrained agents depend negatively (as well as
linearly) in the amount of cash-on-hand; borrowing of the constrained agents depends positively
(and linearly) in the amount of cash-on-hand in the region where these agents spend most of their
time. I then characterize the transitional dynamics of the model when the only ￿aggregate￿shock
is a one-time change in earnings dispersion that mimics the average increase in inequality of the
4Den Haan (1997), Krusell and Smith (1998) and R￿os-Rull (1999) have proposed methods to solve incomplete
market models with a large number of agents and idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks that do not rely upon lineariza-
tions. These methods are computationally too burdensome to be adapted to a model with several state variables and
shocks drawn from a continuous support.
41980s and the 1990s. As the results show, the predictions of the non-linear model are very close
to those of the linearized model: the amount of debt is higher when inequality is higher; impatient
agents are always at their borrowing ceiling; and patient agents smooth their consumption very
e⁄ectively and almost never hit the upper bound on their debt.
Section 1 brie￿ y reviews the facts. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the
calibration and the simulation of the model. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 contains
robustness analysis. Section 6 discusses the transitional dynamics of the nonlinear model. Section
7 concludes.
1. Debt and Inequality in the United States
Household Debt. The top panel of Figure 1 plots household debt over disposable personal
income from 1963 to 2003. The ratio of debt to income was relatively stable throughout the 1960s
and the 1970s, which led some economists to suggest that monetary policy should target broad
credit aggregates in place of monetary aggregates. Debt to income expanded at a fast pace from
the mid 1980s on, fell slightly in the 1990￿1991 recession, and began a gradual increase from 1994
on. At the end of 2003, the ratio of household debt to disposable personal income was 113 percent.
The increase in debt has been accompanied by a gradual rise over time of commonly used measures
of ￿nancial sector imbalances. For instance, the household debt service ratio (an estimate of the
ratio of debt payments to disposable personal income) rose from 0.106 in 1983 to 0.132 in 2003.
The increase in household debt has been common to both home mortgage debt and consumer debt,
although it has been more pronounced for the former. Consumer debt averaged around 20 percent
of disposable personal income in the early period and rose to about 25 percent in the later period.
Mortgage debt (which includes home equity lines of credit and home equity loans) to disposable
personal income averaged around 40 percent in the 1960￿1980 period and rose to about 75 percent
in the late 1990s.5
Inequality. Several papers have documented upward trends in income and earnings inequality
in the United States (see Katz and Autor, 1999, Mo¢ tt and Gottschalk, 2002, Piketty and Saez,
2003, Eckstein and NagypÆl, 2004, Krueger and Perri, 2006, and Lemieux, 2006). As shown in
the top panel of Figure 1, inequality was little changed in the 1960s, increased slowly in the
1970s and sharply in the early 1980s, and has continued to rise, at a slightly slower pace, since
5Consistent data on home equity loans go back only to the 1990s. According to these data, home equity loans
rose from 5 to 8 percent of disposable income between 1991 and 2003.
5the 1990s. Looking across studies and data sets, inequality (measured by the standard deviation
of log earnings) appears to have increased by about 15 log points between the beginning of the
1980s and the late 1990s. The magnitude of the increase is fairly similar across di⁄erent data sets
(Consumer Expenditure Survey, Panel Study of Income Dynamics and Current Population Survey)
and de￿nitions of income (pre-tax wages, post-tax wages and total earnings).6
Against the backdrop of rising income inequality, consumption inequality has risen by a smaller
amount. For instance, Krueger and Perri (2006) ￿nd that the standard deviation of log consumption
rose by about 7 log points (half as much as that of income) between 1980 and 2003.
2. The Model
The Environment. My model is a simpli￿ed version of the Krusell and Smith (1998) framework
in which the stochastic growth model is modi￿ed to account for individual heterogeneity. Time is
discrete. The economy consists of a large number of in￿nitely-lived agents who are distinguished by
the scale of their income, by their discount rates, and by their access to the credit market. Agents
are indexed by i. Each agent receives a stochastic income endowment and accumulates ￿nancial
assets and real assets (a house) over time.7
The credit market works as follows. A fraction of the agents (unconstrained, patient agents) can
freely trade one-period consumption loans, subject to a no-Ponzi-game condition. The remaining
agents (constrained, impatient agents) cannot commit to repay their loans and need to post col-
lateral to secure access to the credit market. By contrast, unbacked claims are enforceable among
patient agents, whose credit limits are so large that they never bind. For all agents, the amounts
they are allowed to borrow can be repaid with probability one, and there is no default.
On the income side, agents di⁄er in the scale of their total endowment, which, absent shocks,
can be thought as the source of permanent inequality in the economy. Earnings di⁄erentials across
agents are exogenous.8 For each agent, the log earning process is the sum of three components: (1)
6Besides Figure 1 in this paper, see, for instance, Figure 2b in the appendix of Lemieux (2005), for hourly pre-tax
wages using the CPS as well as the May and Outgoing Rotation Group supplements of the CPS; Figure 1 in Krueger
and Perri (2006), for labor income after taxes and transfers using Consumer Expenditure Survey data; and Figure 1
in Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2004), using PSID data.
7Unlike Krusell and Smith (1998), my main focus is on endogenous borrowing constraints and on the distribution
of ￿nancial assets across households. For this reason, I abstract from capital accumulation and from endogenous
labor supply.
8In the model, I refer to income and earnings inequality interchangeably excluding any gain/loss from interest
payments from the income/earnings de￿nition.
6an individual-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect; (2) a time-varying aggregate component; and (3) a time-varying
individual component.
Patient Agents. A fraction n
N of agents have a low discount rate and do not face borrowing
constraints (other than a no-Ponzi-game condition). Each of them maximizes a lifetime utility
function over consumption and durables (housing) given by:
maxE0
P1
t=0 ￿t (logcit + j loghit)
where i = f1;2;3;:::;ng; where c is consumption, and h denotes holdings of durables (whose services
are assumed to be proportional to the stock). The ￿ ow of wealth constraint is:
cit + hit ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)hit￿1 + Rt￿1bit￿1 = yit + bit ￿ ￿(bit ￿ bi)
2 (1)
where bi denotes debt (so that ￿bi denotes ￿nancial assets) of agent i; R is the gross interest rate,
and yi is the household income. The last term represents an arbitrarily small quadratic cost of
holding a quantity of debt di⁄erent from bi (that will be the steady state debt for agent i). This
cost allows pinning down steady state ￿nancial positions of each agent in this group, but has no
e⁄ect on the dynamics of the model.9 For each agent, the ￿rst order conditions involve standard
Euler equations for consumption and durables as follows:10
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Impatient Agents. A fraction N￿n
N of agents discount the future more heavily11 and face a
collateral constraint that limits the amount of borrowing to a time-varying fraction of their durables.
9Throughout the paper, I abstract from aggregate growth. Starting from the data, I detrend log real income using
a bandpass ￿lter that isolates the frequencies between 1 and 8 years; the same trend in income is used to detrend
real debt, so that the ratio of detrended real debt to detrended real GDP is identical to the ratio of the non-￿ltered
series. One could easily incorporate growth in the model. For example, one could assume a deterministic trend in
aggregate income and then de￿ne a transformed, stationary economy with slightly altered discount factors and a slight
modi￿cation of the budget constraints. This economy would then have the same properties of the non-transformed
economy without growth. See, for instance, the discussion in Aiyagari (1994).




11Impatience is a convenient modeling device to obtain an equilibrium in which some agents are credit constrained.
Several studies (see, for instance, the references cited in Frederick, Loewenstein, and O￿ Donoghue, 2002) have found
large empirical support for discount rate heterogeneity across the population.
7With this assumption, I want to capture the idea that, for some agents, enforcement problems are
such that only real assets can be used as a form of collateral. The problem they solve is:
maxE0
P1
t=0 ￿t (logcit + j loghit)
where i = fn + 1;n + 2;:::;Ng, where ￿ < ￿; subject to the following budget constraint:
cit + hit ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)hit￿1 + Rt￿1bit￿1 = yit + bit (4)
and to the following borrowing constraint:
bit ￿ mthit. (5)
For each unit of h they own, impatient agents can borrow at most mt: exogenous time variation in
m proxies for any shock to the economy-wide supply of credit that is independent of income, as in





















These conditions are thus isomorphic to those of patient agents, with the crucial addition of ￿it;
the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint. It is straightforward to show that, around the
non-stochastic steady state, the low discount factor will push impatient agents toward the borrowing
constraint. In other words, as long as ￿ < ￿; the multiplier ￿ on the borrowing constraint will be
strictly positive.12 As a consequence, the patient agents￿behavior will determine the interest rate
on the entire equilibrium path.13
Equilibrium. A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of stationary stochas-
tic processes fht;ct;bt;Rtg
1
t=0 for the endogenous variables, where ht = fh1t;:::;hNtg; ct =
fc1t;:::;cNtg; and bt = fb1t;:::;bNtg are vectors collecting the individual variables, satisfying Euler
equations, budget and borrowing constraints, and the following market clearing condition:
PN
i=1 (cit + (hit ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)hit￿1)) +
Pn
i=1 ￿(bit ￿ bi)
2 =
PN
i=1 yit ￿ Yt.
12To obtain this result, the impatience motive must be su¢ ciently strong. The result also holds in the stationary
equilibrium and in the transition of the non-linear model solved in Section 6.
13Krusell, Kuru‚ s￿u and Smith (2001) illustrate a similar point in a model with quasi-geometric discounting and
heterogeneity in preferences. See also Iacoviello (2005) for a related application and for a discussion in the context
of a monetary business cycle model with heterogeneous agents.
8given the processes for yt = fy1t;:::;yNtg and mt and the initial conditions fht￿1;bt￿1;Rt￿1g.
Operationally, I ￿nd the (certainty-equivalent) laws of motion of the model by linearizing around
the steady state the set of equations describing the equilibrium and using the method of undeter-
mined coe¢ cients.14 If the number of agents in the model is N, the linearized model features
4N + 3 equations. For each agent, there are a ￿ ow of funds constraint, two Euler equations, and
an income process equation. The remaining three equations are, respectively, the market clearing
condition (which determines the interest rate) and the processes for aggregate income and for the
loan-to-value. I set N = 500 in my computations.15
Dynamics. To study the dynamics of the economy, I consider the following experiment. I assume
that, before 1963, the economy is at its non-stochastic steady state. There are then unexpected
shocks to aggregate income, to the loan-to-value ratio, and to individual incomes. These shocks are
constructed from actual data so that their sequence matches the behavior of aggregate earnings,
loan-to-values, and earnings inequality. For each individual, income evolves according to
yit = fiatzit
where fi is an individual speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect; at denotes an aggregate component; and zit de-
notes an idiosyncratic component. The aggregate and idiosyncratic components obey the following
autoregressive representations:16
logat = ￿a logat￿1 + eat
logzit = ￿z logzit￿1 + eit






The variable eit is independently distributed across agents but not over time: that is, the variance of
14To achieve a good approximation, I log-linearize the variables that are linear in logs, like individual income. I also
use log-linearization for consumption and housing, and for the debt of constrained agents, which is always positive
along the equilibrium path. Because ￿nancial assets of the unconstrained agents can take on negative as well as
positive values, I linearize (instead of log-linearizing) this variable.
15For the idiosyncratic shocks to wash out in the aggregate, one would like to set N to an arbitrarily large number,
so that the law of large numbers holds. I ensure that the idiosyncratic shocks do not have aggregate e⁄ects by
centering them appropriately. See Appendix A for more details. The model predictions were virtually identical for
N = 200 and for N = 500; so I concluded that setting N = 500 as opposed to a larger number does not materially
a⁄ect the results of the simulations.
16Once the vector of shocks is realized in each period t, agents form expectations on the paths of the exogenous
variables according to their laws of motion and forecast future quantities and prices on the basis of all available
information at time t.
9the individual income shocks is allowed to be time-varying. By virtue of the law of large numbers,
these shocks a⁄ect only the distribution of income but not its mean level. (See Appendix B for more
on this. Because the variance of the shocks is time varying, one needs to correct the cross-sectional
mean of eit so that the mean level of income remains constant over time; otherwise aggregate
income would be high in periods of high idiosyncratic variance.) Finally, the loan-to-value ratio
follows:
mt = (1 ￿ ￿m)mss + ￿mmt￿1 + emt






3. Calibration and Simulation
Overview. To check whether the model can account for the main stylized facts in the data, I use
the following procedure:
1. In the initial steady state, I set logat = 0 and logzit = 0 for all i￿ s. I set the ￿xed e⁄ects
in the income process (the distribution of fi) to match the 1963 standard deviation of log
incomes.
2. I calibrate the model, so that the initial steady state matches key observations of the US econ-
omy in 1963. In detail, I set the parameters describing preferences and technology (￿;￿;￿;j)
so that in the initial steady state the ratio of durable wealth to income and the interest rate
match the data.
3. Once I choose a steady state value for the loan-to-value mss, the model endogenously generates
aggregate debt holdings for the constrained agents. Next, I choose the bi￿ s in the bond holding
cost function for the unconstrained agents so that the aggregate bond market clears:
PN
i=1 bi = 0,




i=1 (bitjbit > 0).
In 1963, the ratio of household debt to disposable personal income was 0:66: Hence, I choose
a distribution of bi￿ s across the unconstrained agents in a way that:
Pn
i=1 bi (bijbi > 0)










104. From the data, I construct sequences of aggregate income shocks, ￿nancial shocks (time
variation in the loan-to-value ratio mt), and idiosyncratic income shocks (time variation in
the cross-sectional earnings dispersion). I then feed the estimated shocks into the model￿ s
linearized decision rules starting from 1963, and I check whether the time series generated from
the model can replicate the behavior of debt, consumption inequality, and wealth inequality
which are observed in the data.
Calibration. The time period is one year. This re￿ ects the lack of higher frequency measures
of income inequality, which are needed to construct the processes for idiosyncratic shocks. Table 1
summarizes the calibration. As explained above, the parameter choices are meant to capture the
initial steady state distribution of income and ￿nancial assets, as well as the ratio of durable wealth
to output.
Given that patient agents are unconstrained in steady state, I set their discount factor to 0:965:
this pins down the real interest rate at 3:5 percent per year. The durable/housing preferences weight
j is chosen to match the steady state ratio of household real estate wealth over income. A choice
of j = 0:117 (together with ￿ = 0:04) implies that this ratio is 1:39, like its data counterpart17
in 1963. Together with the housing depreciation rate, this ensures that steady state residential
investment is about 5:5 percent of income. The discount factor for impatient agents is set at 0:865.
This number is in the ballpark of the estimates of Lawrence (1991), Samwick (1998) and Warner
and Pleeter (2001).18 Although it does not have big e⁄ects on the dynamics, it guarantees that the
impatience motive for this group is large enough that, even in the presence of large income shocks,
they are almost surely borrowing constrained. The ￿xed e⁄ects in the earnings process are chosen
so that the cross-sectional standard deviation of log earnings is 0:5173 in the initial steady state.
The share of unconstrained agents is set to 65 percent, a value in the range of estimates in
the literature. Using aggregate data, Campbell and Mankiw (1989) estimate a fraction of rule-of-
thumb/constrained consumers of around 40 percent. Using the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances,
Jappelli (1990) estimates 20 percent of the population to be liquidity constrained. Iacoviello (2005)
￿nds that a share of constrained consumers of 34 percent helps to explain the positive response
of aggregate spending to a housing price shock. I then pick the loan-to-value ratios. In 1963, the
17See Table B.100 of the Flow of Funds accounts, Z.1 release.
18Lawrence (1991) uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to estimate discount rates ranging from
12 to 19 percent. Samwick (1998) uses an OLG model and data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and ￿nds
discount rates ranging between -15 and 20 percent. Warner and Pleeter (2001) use evidence from military downsizing
programs to estimate personal discount rates ranging between 0 and 30 percent.
11average loan-to-value ratio for new home purchases was 0:729. Setting the initial value of m to this
number generates a ratio of debt held by constrained agents to total output of 31 percent.
As outlined above, the distribution of ￿nancial assets across unconstrained agents is chosen to
match the 1963 value of household debt to income of 0:66. I ￿rst split unconstrained agents (65
percent of the population) into creditors and debtors, and assume that creditors are 35 percent of
the total (and claim 66 percent of the total debt) and debtors are 30 percent of the total (and own,
as a group, 35 percent of debt, that is, total debt less debt owned by constrained agents). This is
roughly in line with data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which indicate that a small
fraction of the population has positive net ￿nancial assets.19 Next, I assume that ￿nancial assets
(for the creditors) and liabilities (for the unconstrained debtors) are both log-normally distributed
with the same standard deviation as that of log incomes. This way, the overall wealth distribution is
more skewed than the income distribution, as in the data. Once the distributions are created, I have
to decide the joint probability distribution of income and net ￿nancial assets for the unconstrained
agents. The 1998 SCF documents a strong positive correlation between incomes and net ￿nancial
assets, mainly driven by the large positive correlation between income and net ￿nancial assets at the
top end of the income distribution.20 However, analogous data from the 1983 SCF show an opposite
pattern, showing a negative correlation.21 The 1962 survey (the only survey conducted before 1983)
is less detailed and harder to interpret, because the data classi￿cations exclude mortgage debt from
the ￿nancial liabilities. Because of this con￿ icting evidence, I assume that the net ￿nancial position
of all unconstrained agents is uncorrelated with their initial income, but I report the results using
alternative assumptions in Section 5. The left panel of Figure 2 is a scatter plot of the joint cross-
sectional distribution of income and debt in the 1963 steady state. Finally, the bond adjustment
cost ￿ is set equal to 0:0001: This number is small enough that it has no e⁄ect on the dynamics,
but it ensures that, even when the economy is solved using linear methods, the individual bond
positions are mean-reverting and the long-run value of household debt is equal to the initial value.
In the initial steady state, impatient agents have lower consumption-earnings and housing-
earnings ratios. This is due both to their low discount rates, which induce them to accumulate less
wealth, and to their steady state debt burden, which reduces their current period resources. The
19I construct net ￿nancial assets from the SCF data as the di⁄erence between positive ￿nancial assets (like stocks,
bonds, and checking accounts) and ￿nancial debts (like mortgages, car loans and credit card debt). Because my model
does not di⁄erentiate among ￿nancial assets, it is plausible to look at this variable in the data as the counterpart to
net ￿nancial assets (that is, minus b) in my model.
20See Aizcorbe, Kennickell and Moore (2003).
21See Kennickell and Shack-Marquez (1992).
12average propensities to consume for constrained and unconstrained agents are, respectively, 0:92
and 0:96; the average holdings of housing over income are, respectively, 1:15 and 1:53.
Recovering the Stochastic Processes for the Shocks. I extract the income shock from the
log real disposable personal income series (see Appendix A for more details on the data). First, I
use a bandpass ￿lter that isolates frequencies between 1 and 8 years to remove the trend component.
The resulting series is then modeled as an AR(1) process and used to construct the log(at) process.
The series has the following properties:
logat = 0:54logat￿1 + eat; ￿ea = 0:024
and is positively correlated with the usual business cycle indicators; in particular, it shows declines
in the periods associated with NBER-dated recessions. The top panel of Figure 3 plots the implied
time series for the shock processes normalized to zero in 1963.
It is hard to construct a single indicator of the tightness of borrowing constraints, as measured
by mt. Financial liberalization has been a combination of a variety of factors that no single indicator
can easily capture. Because it comes closest to proxying for the model counterpart, I use the loan-
to-price ratio on conventional mortgages for newly-built homes to construct the ￿nancial shocks.
This way, I can construct a measure of time-varying liquidity constraints, which gives me the process
for mt.22 As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3, loan-to-value ratios have increased by a small
amount over the sample relative to the 1963 baseline (which was 0:729), rising by about 5 percent.
A sharp increase occurred in the early 1980s, when the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the
Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 expanded households￿options in mortgage markets, thus relaxing
collateral constraints. The resulting series for the ￿nancial shock is (omitting the constant term):
mt = 0:84mt￿1 + emt; ￿em = 0:011.
The series for m (normalized to 0 in the base year) is plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 3. The
series displays a slight upward trend over time, which was not stastically signi￿cant.23 Of course, it
is possible that this crude measure of ￿nancial liberalization does not capture in a comprehensive
way the many possible ways in which the ￿nancial reforms of the 1980￿ s and the 1990￿ s might have
22Other measures of ￿nancial innovation, such as the homeowner￿ s share of equity in her home, the percent of
loans made with small down payments, or measures of credit availability from the Fed￿ s Senior Loan O¢ cer Opinion
Survey, su⁄er from two main problems. First, they are more likely to su⁄er from endogeneity problems. Second, they
su⁄er from a scaling problem: while they are likely to be good qualitative indicators of credit availability, they are
harder to map into a quantitative indicator that can be fed into a model.
23I tested for the signi￿cance of a trend coe¢ cient in the process for the LTV ratio. Repeating this regression
13improved access to credit for househols, thus biasing downward the contribution of ￿nancial reforms
to the rise of household debt.
Finally, Appendix B describes how I use the observed measures of time-varying income inequal-
ity (measured by the cross-sectional variance of log incomes) to recover the idiosyncratic shocks
that are consistent with given variations in income inequality, once assumptions are made about
the persistence of the individual income process. Here I summarize my procedure. In the initial
non-stochastic steady state, income dispersion is given by the variance of the log ￿xed e⁄ects,
var(logfi). Over time, given the formula for the individual income processes, the cross-sectional









that is, observed income dispersion comes partly from the past, partly from new innovations. Given
assumptions about ￿z; one can use the time-series data on var(logyt) to construct recursively the
time series of the cross-sectional variance v2
t of the individual shocks. Given the vector v2
t; one
can then draw from a normal distribution, in each period t, an N ￿ 1 vector of the individual
innovations having a standard deviation equal to vt.
A crucial parameter determining the behavior of the model is ￿z; the autocorrelation in the indi-
vidual income process. Heaton and Lucas (1996) allow for permanent but unobservable household-
speci￿c e⁄ects and ￿nd a value of ￿z = 0:53 using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Storeslet-
ten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) estimate a much higher value of ￿z = 0:95; although their estimates
are based on the assumption of a slightly di⁄erent income process. I take a value in between these
numbers and choose ￿z = 0:75: In Section 5, I document the robustness of my results to various
alternative values of ￿z.
Given observations on var(logyt) and for a given choice of ￿z, I construct time series for the
individual income processes that allow replicating the behavior of income dispersion over time.
Because of the sampling uncertainty associated with each draw of idiosyncratic shocks, I report in
the next sections data on the median result across 500 replications, and, when applicable, I plot in
the ￿gures the 10th and 90th percentile for the simulated model statistics.
Some Caveats.
including a time trend yields:
mt = 0:67mt￿1 + 0:00041t + emt.
The coe¢ cient on the trend variable is positive, but the t-statistic is only 1:83 (with a p-value of 0:08), hence the
null hypothesis of no trend cannot be rejected using conventional signi￿cance levels.
141. Total inequality (income variance) is the sum of temporary inequality (due to shocks) and
permanent inequality (due to ￿xed e⁄ects), if shocks are uncorrelated with the ￿xed e⁄ect.
In the initial steady state, all of the dispersion in earnings is due to the ￿xed e⁄ect. With in-
equality growing over time, I can almost in every period back out the sequences of i.i.d. shocks
feitg with variance v2
t that solve equation (8) given the observed behavior of var(logyt).24
2. An implicit assumption of the model is that, at the individual level, starting from 1963;
individuals face a sequence of income shocks whose variance is increasing over time. Because
linearization implies that the optimal decision rules of the agents are linear in the state of the
economy (which includes the shocks themselves), this allows characterizing the dynamics of
the model even in the presence of time-varying volatility.
4. Comparing the Model to the Data: 1963-2003
Model Behavior. At the individual level, idiosyncratic shocks account for a large portion of
income volatility. In response to positive income innovations, unconstrained agents behave like
permanent income consumers, increasing expenditure by a small amount and reducing their debt.
Instead, constrained agents behave like hand-to-mouth consumers and use the extra income to
acquire more durables, to borrow more, and to spend more. To illustrate this point, Figure 4
plots typical income, consumption, and debt pro￿les over the simulation period for constrained
and unconstrained agents. Across agents, the average correlation between debt and income level is
￿0:28 for the unconstrained agents, 0:95 for the constrained ones.
Table 2 reports some summary statistics. As shown in Figure 5, aggregate non-durable con-
sumption is smoother than aggregate output, re￿ ecting the fact that expenditure on durables is
relatively more volatile. Interest rates move little, since they re￿ ect the smooth consumption pro￿le
of unconstrained agents. As in many incomplete market models, individual consumption is more
volatile than aggregate consumption. The standard deviation of consumption growth for the typi-
cal unconstrained agent is twice as large as that of aggregate consumption growth; for constrained
agents, the corresponding ratio is about 12, thus suggesting that self-insurance does not work well
for this group. Across all groups, the standard deviation of the individual consumption growth rate
is about 0.08. This amount of consumption volatility is much higher than what a complete markets
model would predict. Using the Consumption Expenditure Survey data, Brav, Constantinides, and
24I use the word almost because the assumption of no correlation between shocks and ￿xed e⁄ects places a lower
bound on the value of inequality that can be matched by the data. For this reason, the model cannot ￿t exactly
inequality in the 1970s, when earnings dispersion temporarily declined.
15Geczy (2002) ￿nd that the standard deviation of quarterly consumption growth is about 0:0633
for households with positive assets. If quarterly consumption growth is i.i.d., this corresponds to a
standard deviation of annual consumption growth of 0:127.
Aside from these individual stories, there is one important consequence of the aggregate impli-
cations of varying cross-sectional income dispersion. In the plots of Figure 4, one can notice how
the individual income patterns become more erratic from the 1980s onward, re￿ ecting the model
parameterization that captures the rising earnings inequality in the data. Because consumption of
the unconstrained agents will move much less than earnings, the increased dispersion of earnings
will lead to a larger dispersion of ￿nancial assets.25
Main Findings.
1. The model successfully captures the trend behavior of debt over income.
In the data, the household debt-to-income ratio rises from 66 percent in 1963 to 113 percent
in 2003. Figure 6 compares the model with the data. The ￿gure shows that the equilibrium
path from the model mirrors very closely the actual path of the data. As in the data, the
model predicts, starting from the 1963 steady state, ￿ at household debt-to-income ratios until
the mid-1980s, and a sharp increase from the mid-1980s on. The increase is more pronounced
in periods in which inequality rises very fast, and lags inequality slightly.
2. The model roughly captures the cyclical behavior of debt.
Figure 7 compares year-on-year debt growth in the model and in the data. The correlation
between the two series is clearly positive (its average value is 0:46) and di⁄erent from zero at
conventional signi￿cance levels. In the earlier period, the model captures well the comovement
between the two series, although the volatility of debt growth is smaller than in the data. In
the later period, the cyclical variation of the model series is similar to the data, although the
model slightly overpredicts debt growth in the 1980s and underpredicts debt growth in the
1990s and later.
3. The model predicts a small rise of consumption inequality and a large rise in wealth inequality,
as in the data.
Figure 8 plots simulated time pro￿les for income inequality, non-durable consumption in-
equality and wealth inequality. Because wealth can take on negative values, I plot the Gini
25The right panel of Figure 2 plots the 2003 income and debt positions of all agents in a typical simulation.
16index for all three variables. While the Gini index for income rises by 0:10 units over the
sample period, the increase in the Gini index for consumption is only half as much. Krueger
and Perri (2006) document these facts26 in the data and obtain a similar result in a model
of endogenous developments in credit markets. The increase in wealth inequality is much
larger.27 This is explained by the fact that rich people in the model accumulate positive
￿nancial assets over time.28
4. The model attributes the trend increase in debt to the rise in inequality.
A closer look at the sources of shocks in the model highlights the role of income inequality as
the leading cause of the increase in debt over income from 1984 on.
To disentangle the relative contribution of each of the shocks in explaining the time-series
behavior of household debt, Figures 9 and 10 show the historical decomposition of the
debt/income ratio and of debt growth in the model in terms of the three model shocks.29
Figure 9 shows that the behavior of income inequality accounts for the trend variation in
debt. Had income inequality not changed from its baseline value, the debt-to-income ratio
would not have increased. Financial shocks account for about 5 percent of the increase in
debt over income. And cyclical variations in productivity, by their own nature, should not
have a⁄ected long-run trends in debt. Figure 10 illustrates that income and ￿nancial shocks
seem to account well for the positive correlation between debt growth in the model and the
data counterpart, although ￿nancial shocks alone seem unable to capture cyclical movements
in debt growth.
To conclude, given the calibrated income processes, the model captures the cyclical and trend
dynamics of debt on the one hand, and consumption and wealth inequality on the other. This is
especially remarkable, since I have not used these data as an input of my calibration.
26See also Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2004).
27In the simulations, I ￿nd that the fraction of agents with negative wealth, which is about 5 percent at the
beginning, rises to about 15 percent at the end of the sample. The ￿nal number is in line with the data. For instance,
Kennickell (2003, Table 4) reports that 12.3 percent of households had a negative net worth or net worth less than
$1000 (in 2001 dollars) in the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. However, SCF data starting from 1989 do not
show changes in the fraction of households with zero or negative net worth from 1989 to 2001 (see Kennickell, 2003).
28Trends in wealth inequality in the data are hard to establish, although it seems that wealth inequality increased
dramatically in the 1980s and remained high in the 1990s. See Cagetti and De Nardi (2005).
29Because of the sampling uncertainty associated with the draws of the idiosyncratic shocks, I report 90 percent
con￿dence bands for the time series generated in presence of idiosyncratic shocks.
175. Robustness
I performed a number of robustness checks by changing the parameter values within the context
of the benchmark speci￿cation. The basic ￿nding from the experiments is that the increase in
debt that can be quantitatively explained by the rising earnings dispersion is robust to alternative
parameterizations of the model.30
Sensitivity to the share of credit constrained agents. The result holds when the income
share of the unconstrained agents is assumed to be larger than its benchmark value of 65 per-
cent. However, as the share of unconstrained agents becomes larger, the model generates lower
correlations between debt and the data at cyclical frequencies. This is to be expected, because a
non-negligible fraction of credit-constrained agents is necessary to generate procyclical debt growth:
for instance, under the baseline calibration, the model correlation between debt growth and income
growth is 0.55, similar to the data counterpart of 0.49. Table 3 reports how this correlation varies
when the share of impatient/credit constrained agents changes. As the share of the constrained
agents is reduced, the correlation between debt and income growth becomes smaller and smaller.
This is to be expected, since aggregate shocks generate little e⁄ects on the distribution of ￿nancial
assets.
Sensitivity to the initial correlation between income and wealth. I verify the sensitivity of
the results to the initial value of the cross-sectional correlation between income and ￿nancial assets.
This is important for two reasons. On the hand, as mentioned in Section 3; there is scant evidence
on this number in the 1962 (the earliest) Survey of Consumer Finances. On the other, quadratic
cost aside, the model does not generate an endogenous steady state distribution of ￿nancial assets,
so it is important to verify how the initial conditions shape the subsequent dynamics of the economy.
The results are robust to various assumptions about the initial correlation between ￿nancial debt
and income for the unconstrained group (for the constrained group, this correlation is 1; since
borrowing is a constant fraction of housing holdings, which are, in turn, a constant fraction of
income). The increase in debt predicted by the model is slightly higher if the initially rich people
also have larger values of debt, but the quantitative di⁄erences are very small. If I assume that
30The results are similar when one introduces a quadratic adjustment cost of individual durables in the baseline
model. Obviously, this has the e⁄ect of smoothing aggregate durables relative to aggregate consumption, but the
behavior of household debt is unchanged for reasonable parameterizations of the cost. By making nondurable con-
sumption more volatile, this extension also has the e⁄ect of increasing the volatility of the interest rate to magnitudes
similar to those in the data.
18the initial correlation between income and debt is strongly negative (close to ￿1), the predicted
debt-to-income ratio in 2003 is 1:12; in the opposite case (positive initial correlation between debt
and income for all agents, including unconstrained agents), the predicted ratio is 1:17: Evidently,
the initial conditions do not play a major role in a⁄ecting the evolution of debt over time.
Sensitivity to the decomposition of permanent and transitory inequality. In the ￿nal
experiment, I consider how the behavior of debt depends on the degree of individual income persis-
tence ￿z. Given the observed behavior of earnings inequality over time, the persistence of individual
incomes is the key determinant in a⁄ecting how mobile the individuals are along the income lad-
der. More persistent income shocks imply, ceteris paribus, less mobility. Table 4 shows the main
￿ndings. Interestingly, the increase in debt predicted by the model is a non-monotonic function
of the persistence of the individual shocks. In my baseline calibration, I set the autocorrelation of
individual shocks to 0:75: when income inequality rises, the debt to income ratio goes from 0.66 to
1.15. As income shocks become very persistent, individuals are less willing to smooth consumption
over time and to accumulate debt or assets via access to the credit market: in the limit, when
shock are close to being permanent, a larger volatility of shocks does not imply higher dispersion of
￿nancial assets, since individual consumption and income closely track each other; for instance, an
autocorrelation of 0:97 implies a ￿nal debt to income ratio of 1:03; an autocorrelation of 0:99 implies
a ￿nal debt to income ratio of 0:71. When income shocks are too transitory, agents smooth their
consumption very often, but their relative position along the income ladder changes substantially
every period and so does their demand for ￿nancial assets. Because the distribution of ￿nancial
assets is continuously reshu› ed, debt does not display persistence at the aggregate level, and does
not rise substantially when income dispersion increases. For instance, iid income shocks imply a
rise in the debt to income ratio from 0.66 to 0.82.
An important conclusion is that the increase in debt during the period 1984-2003 can be ex-
plained by the model only if the increased earnings dispersion comes from income shocks that are
mean-reverting. Put di⁄erently, the increase in inequality that has taken place in the 1980s and
1990s can quantitatively explain the increase in household debt insofar as it has resulted from an
increase in the variance of the non-permanent component of earnings.
What do the data say in this regard? Using PSID data, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2004) decompose the evolution of the cross-sectional variance of earnings over the period 1967-1996
into the variances of ￿xed e⁄ects, persistent shocks, and transitory shocks. They show that the
increased earnings variance of the period, say, 1980-1996 can be accounted for by three components
19in roughly equal parts. Following their numbers and speci￿cation, I assume that the stochastic
component of income is the sum of a very persistent component (with autoregressive coe¢ cient
of 0:985),31 a persistent one, with persistence equal to 0:85 (the average between my baseline
speci￿cation and their estimated value for the persistent component), and a purely iid one. The
very persistent component mimics changes in inequality coming from ￿xed/permanent e⁄ects, once
it is understood that in the model I present here agents can only be interpreted as dynasties (because
they live forever), so that the appropriate counterpart of the model￿ s labor income process in the
data is not the process for given individuals, but the income process of families. In other words, even
if individuals￿income processes had a unit root component in the data, one should not calibrate the
present kind of model to have a unit root, so long as the intergenerational transmission of earnings is
less than perfect.32 I then assume than in each year from 1963 to 2003 each of the three components
(permanent, persistent and transitory) contributes for one third to the observed inequality change in
the Eckstein-NagypÆl CPS series. Using this decomposition, the model predicts a slightly smaller
increase in the debt-to-income ratio, from 0.66 to 0.96. The increase in debt predicted by the
model is now slightly lower than in the data and in the baseline calibration, mostly because there
is less incentive to access the credit market in response to changes in uncertainty coming from the
near-permanent component.33
6. Assessing the Accuracy of the Solution: Transitional Dynamics of the Nonlin-
ear Model
The linearization technique adopted so far, although extremely convenient and easy to implement,
has the drawback of neglecting the e⁄ect of risk on optimal decisions and of ignoring constraints
on the asset position that are only occasionally binding. To address these issues, in this section
I study the transitional dynamics of a bare-bones version of the model that can be conveniently
solved using global approximation schemes.
31The choice of 0.985 re￿ ects the fact that a shock with such persistence displays a half-life of 45 years, about the
typical working life.
32Solon (1992), for instance, ￿nds that intergenerational correlation of income is low, roughly 0.35 to 0.40.
33The model assumption that the initial level of inequality comes only from ￿xed e⁄ects simpli￿es the analysis of
the initial steady state, but is not crucial for the results. In experiments not reported here, I also analyzed how the
results change when the initial level of inequality is decomposed into ￿xed and transitory e⁄ects. In this case, the
initial steady state becomes stochastic rather than deterministic, and one needs to reparameterize the initial steady
state accordingly. However, for empirically plausible levels of the initial level of temporary earnings dispersion, the
main results of the paper were not a⁄ected (Additional details are available upon request).
20As in the baseline model, I consider the same economy described in the main text with two
groups of agents: patients (65 percent of the total) and impatients (35 percent). I allow impatient
agents to borrow only up to some fraction m (which I ￿x at 0:729) of their durable holdings, whereas
I restrict the maximum borrowing for patient agents so that they can borrow up to 12 times their
average endowment. Given the admissible realizations for income, this constraint is only marginally
tighter than the natural debt limit, and never binds in the simulations. All the model parameters
are those of the baseline version.
First, I compute stochastic steady states for two model parameterizations in absence of aggre-
gate income shocks and ￿nancial shocks, one with low inequality, one with high inequality. To
ensure comparability with the results of the linearized model, I reverse-engineer the volatility of
the individual income shock in the low volatility regime that ensures, given the other model para-
meters, a debt to income ratio in the stochastic steady state that mimics the data over the period
1963-1980.34 The process for log income is assumed to follow a three-state Markov chain, according
to the procedure developed in Tauchen (1986). In the low-volatility regime, the possible income
realizations are 0:886; 1 and 1:114. In the high-volatility regime, the corresponding values are 0:715,













These parameter choices imply an autocorrelation of income of 0:75 and a cross-sectional stan-
dard deviation of log income of 0:08 in the low volatility regime, 0:21 in the high volatility regime.
The change in inequality between the two regimes mimics the increase in inequality in the 1980s and
1990s (the standard deviation of log earnings increases by about 0.15). Because these numbers do
not account for the total cross-sectional dispersion of earnings in the data, a maintained assumption
here is that residual di⁄erences in the initial level of inequality between the model and the data
are captured by ￿xed e⁄ects.35 The initial earnings dispersion generates a stochastic steady state
where the debt to income ratio is 69 percent, as in the data for the year 1980.
34To ensure comparability with the dynamics of the linearized model, I set the quadratic bond adjustment cost
￿ = 0:0001 here as well, although - unlike in the linearized model - this cost it is not needed to ensure determinacy
and stability of the equilibrium. For each patient agent, the cost is paid whenever asset holding are di⁄erent from
zero. As in the linearized model, this cost has no major e⁄ect on the dynamics of the model, but has the e⁄ect of
reducing somewhat the dispersion of assets in the stochastic steady state of the model.
35In experiments not reported here, I found that the results were essentially similar for di⁄erent decompositions of
the dispersion due to ￿xed e⁄ects vis-￿-vis transitory shocks.
21Figure 11 plots the resulting decision rules36 in the stochastic steady state of the low and high
inequality regimes (the income state is assumed to be the median one). For the patient agents
(top panel) the decision rules for borrowing - the amount of ￿nancial liabilities carried into next
period as a function of today￿ s cash-on-hand, de￿ned as coh = (1 ￿ ￿)h￿Rb - are essentially linear
for plausible values of coh; from ￿10 (indicating a ￿nancial asset to income ratio of 10) to +10
(indicating borrowing ten times as large as average income, a value that is almost never achieved
in the simulations, given the mean reverting properties of the income shock). In addition the two
decision rules lie virtually on top of each other:37 partial equilibrium reasoning suggests that, with
high volatility, patient agents should borrow less; however, the equilibrium interest rate is lower in
the high volatility case, thus providing agents with an extra incentive to borrow; quantitatively,
these two e⁄ects roughly cancel with each other. For impatient agents (bottom panel), the decision
rules show that the optimal borrowing to housing ratio is always close to the maximum loan-to-value
ratio for low values of their cash on-hand. In the simulations, these agents spend all of their time
in the upward sloping region of the policy function (borrowing more whenever their cash-on-hand
increases, and borrowing up to the maximum loan to value ratio).
Next I turn to the transitional dynamics. I assume that in 1981 income dispersion rises un-
expectedly to a new, higher level (following an increase in the variance of the innovations to the
income process), which agents expect to persist forever, and then I compute the transition path
of the economy following this change. In terms of the experiment, the only di⁄erence with the
linearized model is that here the change in inequality is assumed to be a one-o⁄ episode,38 whereas
in linearized model it happens more gradually. Figure 12 plots the results of this exercise. In the
top panel, inequality of earnings rises unexpectedly in 1981.39 Over time, agents engage in more
36I approximate the demand for ￿nancial assets from each group by a continuous, piece-wise linear function. To
￿nd the steady state, I use simulated series and a Newton-type algorithm. For a given interest rate, I compute
individual asset demands and simulate N = 1;000 Markov chains of length T = 8;000 periods for the income shock
(35 percent for the impatient agents and 65 percent for the patient agents). In the last period, I calculate aggregate
excess demand for net ￿nancial assets and then update the interest rate until the credit market clears.
37I say ￿essentially￿ because individual borrowing is on average 0.10 higher in low inequality than in the high
inequality case, re￿ ecting standard precautionary saving motives. However, in the high inequality case agents are
more spread out in terms of income and cash-on-hand, and this e⁄ect more than dominates the e⁄ect caused by the
increased precautionary saving.
38Some studies have argued that much of change in inequality in the United States was concentrated in the 1980-
1985 period (e.g. Card and Lemieux, 1994). Supporters of this view will like this experiment more.
39The algorithm that I use to compute the transition between steady states follows R￿os-Rull (1999) with minor
modi￿cations. I assume that the economy reaches the new steady state in 100 years, that is in year 2080. I then guess
a sequence of prices fRtg for t = f1981;1983:::;2080g: Given the policy functions calculated at t = 2080; I compute
22￿consumption smoothing activities￿ , and debt starts rising gradually.40 In the bottom panel, the
increase in debt is of similar magnitude to the data, thus con￿rming the accuracy of the linearized
model. In particular, the debt to income ratio predicted for 2003 is 102 percent. Not plotted in
the ￿gure, the ￿nal debt to income ratio in the stochastic steady state (achieved around year 2050)
is 149 percent. Hence, according to the model, debt would continue to rise before stabilizing to a
higher level even if income inequality were to remain constant in the future at 2003 level.41
7. Conclusions
This paper has constructed and simulated a heterogeneous agents model that mimics the distribu-
tion of income in the United States in the period 1963￿2003. Such a model can explain remarkably
well the endogenous dynamics of household debt. The rise in income inequality of the 1980s and
the 1990s can, at the same time, account for the increase in household debt, the large widening of
wealth inequality, and the relative stability of consumption inequality.
As to the consumption inequality result, one related paper is Krueger and Perri (2006). They
argue that, in the data, consumption inequality has risen much less than income inequality. They
present a model of endogenous market incompleteness in which the incentive to trade assets is
directly related to the uncertainty faced at the individual level. They show that only such a model
is able to predict a modest decrease in within-group consumption inequality alongside an increase
in between-group consumption inequality. In the model presented here, the mechanism through
which consumption inequality rises less than income inequality in an expansion of credit from the
rich to the poor. The emphasis on the business cycle implications of household debt, instead, has
policy functions and decision rules for t = f2079;2078:::;1981g by iterating backwards in time. I then simulate the
distribution forward for the transition path starting at t = 1981; and check whether the credit market clear at each
point during the transition (if not, I use a Gauss-Seidel algorithm to make a new guess for fRtg until convergence).
Typically, convergence is achieved after 50 periods, so the number of transition periods is not a⁄ecting the results.
40Not shown in the picture, the interest rate ￿rst undershoots and then converges to a new, lower steady state
value from below.
41Risk aversion could potentially play a bigger role in the non-linear model, where high risk aversion implies, ceteris
paribus, a more ￿concave￿consumption function. I have analyzed what happens if risk aversion rises to a larger value
(working with a per-period utility function of the form u =
￿
c ￿ h
j￿1￿￿ =(1 ￿ ￿); that nests the log-log case in the
text when ￿ approaches unity). High risk aversion (say a coe¢ cient of risk aversion of ￿ = 3) implies a lower interest
rate and a higher level of aggregate debt to income. Following an increase in uncertainty, total debt rises by an
amount that is quantitatively similar to that in case of log utility. This happens because, in spite of the higher risk
aversion, agents operate in a region of the consumption function where the policy functions are essentially linear, and
because their behavior is guided mainly by intertemporal concerns rather than by insurance motives.
23also been analyzed by Campbell and Hercowitz (2005). They show how a business cycle model with
endogenous labor supply and time-varying collateral constraints can account for lower volatility of
output and debt when collateral constraints are relaxed.
The modeling setup presented here shares common ground with the literature on general equi-
librium models with idiosyncratic risk and incomplete markets. Most of the papers in this spirit
have mainly focused on the ability of this class of models to explain the distribution of consumption,
income, and wealth (for instance Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994) and Castaneda, D￿az-GimØnez,
and R￿os-Rull (2003)), and on the role that heterogeneity plays in a⁄ecting macroeconomic out-
comes (see for instance Krusell and Smith (1998)). In my paper, the emphasis is instead on the
behavior of a variable (household debt) that has received very little attention in this class of models.
To keep the model simple and tractable, I stay away from the important question of whether micro
heterogeneity ampli￿es macroeconomic shocks: extensions to allow for these elements would be
worthwhile ideas. Of course, it would be also interesting to see how the model results are a⁄ected
when additional elements of realism are introduced. In this vein, variable collateral prices and
overlapping generations considerations also appear plausible candidates to ￿ll the gap between the
model and reality.42
42Using an Aiyagari-style model with overlapping generations, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2004) show
that the changing relative importance of permanent versus transitory shocks to wages over has important implications
for the extent to which wage inequality translates into consumption inequality. Nakajima (2005) uses a similar OLG
setup to study the e⁄ects of rising earnings instability on mortgage debt and housing prices.
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27Appendix A: Data description and treatment
Description
￿ The disposable personal income series are produced by the BEA.
The nominal and real series are available at the FRED2 website respectively at:
- http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/dpi
- http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/dpic96
The ratio between the two series is used to construct the de￿ ator of nominal debt.
￿ Data on total household (end of period, outstanding) debt are from the Flow of Funds Z1 release. The series
is also available through FRED2 at
- http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CMDEBT
Data on household debt service and ￿nancial obligations ratios are available at
- http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/housedebt/default.htm
The breakdown of total household debt into mortgage and consumer debt is in the Flow of Funds Z1 release,
Table D.3, available at
- http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/Disk/gtabs.zip
Data on home equity loans are in Table L.218.
￿ Data on loan-to-value ratios are taken from the Federal Housing Finance Board. The loan-to-price ratio
measure refers to newly-built homes. It is available at
- http://www.fhfb.gov/GetFile.aspx?FileID=4121
￿ Data on inequality are from Eckstein and NagypÆl (2004), using data drawn from the March Current Population
Survey, and refers to the standard deviation of pre-tax log wages of full-time, full-year male workers. Measures
of inequality based on di⁄erent data sets or di⁄erent samples show the same pattern. The Eckstein-NagypÆl
series ends in 2002. I extrapolate the data for 2003 using earnings inequality data taken from the U.S. Census
Bureau website. The original series is available at
- http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~een461/QRproject/stdev-final.xls
Treatment
In the data, there is trend growth in disposable personal income (DPI), which I account for by detrending real
DPI using a bandpass ￿lter that isolates frequencies between 1 and 8 years. I then construct a de￿ ated, detrended

























The advantage of this procedure is that detrended real debt shows the same trend over time as the original B=Y




can then be used to compare debt
growth in the data with debt growth in the model (see Figure 7).
28Appendix B: Recovering the idiosyncratic shocks
Notation and assumptions
This Section describes how I back out the idiosyncratic income shocks that are able to replicate the observed behavior
of income dispersion over time. There are N individuals, for T periods. Starting at time t = 1; I specify the following
law of motion for individual incomes:
logyit = logat + logfi + logzit
where fi is an individual speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect, at is a log-normally distributed aggregate disturbance, and the time-
varying, individual-speci￿c e⁄ect zit follows a process of the form:
logzit = ￿z logzit￿1 + eit.














The variance of the time-varying shocks vt is allowed to change over time, thus a⁄ecting the cross-sectional
dispersion of earnings over time. The term xt is a time-varying factor that ensures that the mean level of z is unity
for all t.






i=1 yi1 = 1.
Backing out the x￿ s and the v￿ s
Absent aggregate shocks (which, by construction, do not a⁄ect the dispersion of log earnings), it is straightforward
to calculate the conditions under which mean level income will be unity for all t. At time t = 2:













= 1 if x2 = v
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2=2









Next period, when t = 3; we have:























































































43Were xt equal to zero in all periods, the properties of the log-normal distribution would imply that a higher
dispersion of log-incomes would increase the mean of income.
29By the same reasoning, at time t = 4, one ￿nds that:






























































































































The implied volatility of earnings
In each period t; assuming that the vit shocks are uncorrelated over time and with the ￿xed e⁄ect, the cross-sectional
variance of log earnings will be given by:




















Let the economy be in the non-stochastic steady state at time t = 1: At time t = 1; if ei1 = 1 for all i, we have
that v1 = 0 and
var(logy1) = s
2.





















44This procedure applies to cases where income inequality rises from the initial steady state. In periods in which
income inequality falls sharply, it needs to be modi￿ed to allow for a negative correlation between ￿xed e⁄ects and v
shocks.
30Given observations over time on var(logyit); the last three equations and so on for each period t can be used to































Implementation of the algorithm used to calculate the vector of shocks
The algorithm used to back out the individual income shocks goes through the following steps:
1. Given a T ￿ 1 time-series vector of data on income dispersion var(logyt); set the variance of the initial ￿xed
e⁄ects so that
var(logf) = var(logy1) = s
2
where var(logy1) is the variance of log earnings at time 1: This is done by using a random number generator
that creates an N ￿ 1 vector of observations on logf with variance exactly equal to s
2 (and mean equal to
￿s
2=2; so that the steady state average income level is unity). This is done by sampling a random vector N ￿1
from a (0;1) normal distribution, standardizing the vector, multiplying the vector by s; and subtracting s
2=2.
2. Assign a value to ￿z, the autocorrelation of the income shocks. Construct the T ￿ 1 vector of cross-sectional
variances v
2
t using data on var(logyt) using the formulas of the previous Subsection.
3. Using the time-series vector v
2
t; construct recursively the series xt.
4. Construct the T ￿ N matrix (e) of i.i.d. shocks over time having, for each period t, variance equal to v
2
t and
mean equal to xt. To correct for sampling error, go as follows:
1. At time 1; set all of the ￿rst row of e (e1) equal to zero.
2. Construct the second row (e2) of i.i.d. shocks corresponding to t = 2 by generating a random vector of
length N.
3. Ensure that e2 is orthogonal to logf by constructing b e2, the residuals of a regression of e2 on a constant
term and logf. Normalize b e2 so that it has mean equal to x2 and variance equal to v
2
2. Let the resulting
vector be e e2
4. For each successive period, construct et so that it is orthogonal to logf and g et￿1; g et￿2 and so on.
5. Consistent with the value of ￿z; for each i; the time series of length T of income sequences logzit is formed
using:
logzit = ￿z logzit￿1 + eit.
31Parameter Interpretation Value
￿ Discount factor, impatient agents 0.865
￿ Discount factor, patient agents 0.965
j Weight on durables/housing in utility function 0.117
￿ Housing depreciation rate 0.04
m Loan-to-value ratio 0.729
n=N Fraction of unconstrained agents 0.65
Fraction of creditors 0.35
Table 1: Calibrated Parameter Values
Standard deviation
All agents Unconstrained Constrained
Individual consumption growth 0.0794 0.029 0.173
Individual income growth 0.224 0.224 0.224
Standard deviation
Interest rate 0.0035
Aggregate consumption growth 0.014
Aggregate income growth 0.028
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Individual Income and Consumption Volatility.










Table 3: Sensitivity to the Share of Unconstrained Agents.
Note: The second column shows how the correlation between debt growth and income growth changes
as a function of the share of patient/unconstrained. The last row reports the sample correlation between
year-on-year debt growth and income growth in the data.
32Persistence of shock ￿z (D=Y )63 (D=Y )83 (D=Y )03 Corr￿D
D model,data
0 0.66 0.66 0.82 0.45
0.25 0.66 0.67 0.89 0.46
0.5 0.66 0.69 0.99 0.46
0.65 0.66 0.71 1.07 0.46
0.75 0.66 0.72 1.15 0.46
0.85 0.66 0.74 1.23 0.46
0.95 0.66 0.72 1.17 0.47
0.97 0.66 0.69 1.03 0.46
0.99 0.66 0.65 0.71 0.42
Data 0.66 0.66 1.13
Table 4: Sensitivity to the Persistence of the Individual Income Process.
Note: Columns 2 to 4 show the predicted aggregate debt-to-income ratios in 1963, 1983, and 2003, respec-
tively, as a function of the degree of individual income persistence. The last column reports the sample
correlation between year-on-year debt growth in the data and in the model.
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FIGURE 1: The Data 
 



























































































Note: See text and Appendix B for data definitions and sources. In the bottom panel, both series 
have been deflated using the implicit price deflator for personal consumption expenditures. 
 
   35
 FIGURE 2: Initial and Final Earnings and Debt Positions in a Typical Simulation 
 
 






































Notes: Each dot on the diagram represents an individual debt-income position. Negative values 
of debt indicate positive financial assets.   36
FIGURE 3: The Stochastic Processes for Aggregate Income and the Loan-to-Value Ratio 
 





The aggregate income process





The financial shock process
 
 
Notes: The variables are expressed in percent deviations from the initial steady state.   37
FIGURE 4: Earnings, Consumption and Debt Profiles for an Unconstrained and a Constrained 








































Note: All variables are in levels. Both agents are assumed to start with the same debt and 
income and are subject to the same shocks during the simulation period.   38
FIGURE 5: Simulated Time Series for the Macroeconomic Aggregates 
 















FIGURE 6: Comparison between the Model and the Data: Household Debt over Income 
 























Note: The lighter, solid lines indicate 10
th and 90
th percentile for the model variable in the 
simulated data.   40
FIGURE 7: Comparison between Model and Data: Household Debt Growth 
 

















Note: The lighter, solid lines indicate 10
th and 90
th percentile for the model variable in the 
simulated data.  41
 
FIGURE 8: Simulated Time Series for Income, Consumption and Wealth Inequality 
 




Earnings inequality (model), Gini index




Consumption inequality (model), Gini index
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Note: The lighter, solid lines indicate 10
th and 90
th percentile for the model variable in the 
simulated data. 
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FIGURE 9: Counterfactual Experiment: Simulated Time Series for Household Debt over Income 
 















Total debt over Income (m shocks only)
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Total debt over Income (idiosyncratic shocks only)
Year
   43
FIGURE 10: Counterfactual Experiment: Simulated Time Series for Change in Household Debt 
  


































































Note: Debt growth is defined as the change in total household debt scaled by total income.   44
FIGURE 11: Policy Rules for the Non-Linear Model 
 






Decision rules for B', Patient
Beginning of period cash-on-hand
 
 







Decision rules for B', Impatient
Beginning of period cash-on-hand






Decision rules for B'/H', Impatient






Note: The top panel plots the policy function for next period debt of a patient/unconstrained 
agent as a function of beginning of period “cash-on-hand” in the median income state. Cash-on-
hand is defined as beginning of period durables less debt repayment. The bottom panel plots the 
decision rules of an impatient/credit constrained agent: the left panel plots debt as a function of 
beginning of period “cash-on-hand”; the right panel plots the optimal ratio of borrowing over 
durables.   45
FIGURE 12: Transitional Dynamics of the Non-Linear Model following an Increase in Earnings 
Volatility 
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Note: The top panel plots the change in inequality relative to 1963 in the data and in the 
simulated experiment of the non-linear model, where inequality rises by 13 basis points. The 
bottom panel plots the data and the implied behavior of the debt to income ratio. 
 